Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies
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rapport Sep 2014 ; 25 pages
Aut. Yann Rebillé & Lionel Richefort
Ed. Université de Nantes - Nantes
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Résumé:
This study models a bipartite network where links connect agents and public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game, where they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity problem. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. Then, we find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of equilibria. An easy procedure to build networks respecting this condition is finally provided.
Publics-Cibles:
Mots clefs: |
recherche scientifique (CI) (DT) (OP) , service public de l'eau (CI) (DT) (OP) , services essentiels (CI) (DT) (OP) |
Editeur/Diffuseur: |
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Université de Nantes - Nantes |
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