Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies
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report Sep 2014 ; 25 pages
Aut. Yann Rebillé & Lionel Richefort
Ed. Université de Nantes - Nantes
Downloadable format: PdF
(250 ko)
Downloadable from the publisher
Résumé:
This study models a bipartite network where links connect agents and public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game, where they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity problem. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. Then, we find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of equilibria. An easy procedure to build networks respecting this condition is finally provided.
Target Audiences:
Keywords: |
essential services (CI) (DT) (ET) , research (CI) (DT) (ET) , urban water supply (CI) (DT) (ET) |
Publisher/Broadcaster: |
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Université de Nantes - Nantes |
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